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Corporate Responses to Climate Change and Financial Performance: 




This paper examines the relationship between corporate activities to address climate change 
and stock performance. By separately analyzing the US and European stock markets for dif-
ferent sub-periods, we highlight the impact of the underlying climate policy regime. Method-
ologically, we compare risk-adjusted returns of stock portfolios comprising corporations that 
differ in their responses to climate change. In this respect, we apply the flexible Carhart four-
factor model besides the restricted one-factor model based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM). While our portfolio analysis shows negative relationships over the entire observa-
tion period from 2001 to 2006, we find that a trading strategy, which bought stocks of corpo-
rations with a higher level of responses to climate change and sold stocks of corporations with 
a lower level, led to negative abnormal returns in regions and periods with less ambitious cli-
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1. Introduction 
Does it pay for a firm to be green? This issue has already been analyzed for a while, espe-
cially in empirical studies (e.g., Hart and Ahuja, 1996, King and Lenox, 2001, Telle, 2006). 
Knowledge about the effect of corporate environmental performance on financial perform-
ance contributes to the debate about whether managers systematically miss profit opportuni-
ties if they decide against corporate activities to protect the natural environment (e.g., King 
and Lenox, 2002). In this respect, it is also interesting to identify specific success factors for 
environmental strategies that are able to decrease operating costs and/or to increase sales. Fur-
thermore, an understanding of this relationship is relevant for investors: The question is 
whether “green investments”, for example, on the basis of a trading strategy which buys 
stocks or stock portfolios of corporations with stronger environmental performance and sells 
stocks or stock portfolios of corporations with weaker environmental performance, are re-
warded or penalized by the stock markets (e.g., Derwall et al., 2005).  
Knowledge of this relationship is also important for the discussion of different environmental 
policy instruments: If a positive effect of corporate environmental performance on economic 
success really existed, it could be argued that traditional mandatory command and control 
regulations as well as market based approaches – such as green taxes – should be relaxed 
(e.g., Khanna, 2001). Instead, these regulations could be supplemented or even substituted by 
information-based instruments, namely by improving the flow of information with respect to 
this effect (e.g., Telle, 2006). Just like other non-mandatory proactive approaches to environ-
mental protection – such as voluntary unilateral agreements by firms regarding environmental 
management systems according to ISO 14001 – these regulations can be thought to be cost-
efficient because they leave firms with the flexibility to choose the cheapest pollution abate-
ment strategy and reduce governments’ enforcement costs (e.g., Alberini and Segerson, 
2002).    3
While several former empirical studies regarding the effect of corporate environmental per-
formance on financial performance examine environmental performance indicators such as 
toxic emissions (e.g., Hart and Ahuja, 1996, King and Lenox, 2001, 2002), other studies are 
based on broad corporate environmental assessments by rating agencies such as Innovest 
(e.g., Derwall et al., 2005). In contrast, specific corporate responses to climate change have – 
to our knowledge – not been analyzed so far, in part due to the unavailability of appropriate 
data. Indeed, climate change has in the meantime been considered unequivocally existent 
(e.g., IPCC, 2007) and is certainly one of the most important environmental and societal chal-
lenges. As a consequence, climate change can be assumed to have become a relevant corpo-
rate topic (e.g., Porter and Reinhardt, 2007). Against this background, this paper analyzes the 
specific relationship between corporate activities to address climate change and financial per-
formance.  
Our empirical analysis is first based on general theoretical arguments on the relationship be-
tween corporate environmental performance and economic success, for example, with respect 
to high operating costs of environmental activities or increasing reputation due to these activi-
ties. Indeed, we especially argue that the ambiguous positive or negative relationships can 
additionally be influenced by the underlying climate policy regime. For example, it is likely 
that ambitious regulations in this respect strengthen the aforementioned reputation argument 
for corresponding corporate activities. Since the stringency of regulations changes over time, 
we analyze different sub-periods within the entire observation period from 2001 to 2006. Fur-
thermore, climate policy differs between countries or groups of countries (i.e. governments) 
with possible consequences on the analyzed relationship. Due to our availability of the same 
indicators for corporate responses to climate change for different regions, we perform a com-
parative analysis for two main players in international climate policy (e.g., Lange et al., 
2008), namely the USA and Europe (including the European Union, EU).    4
Using stock returns as an indicator for corporate financial performance, we examine the aver-
age stock performance of portfolios that differ with respect to the corporate environmental 
performance, i.e. corporate responses to climate change. In contrast to corresponding econo-
metric analyses at the firm level (e.g., Filbeck and Gorman, 2004, Ziegler et al., 2007a) or 
even short-run event studies (e.g., Konar and Cohen, 1997, Khanna et al., 1998, Dasgupta et 
al., 2001, Gupta and Goldar, 2005), the portfolio analysis approach weakens possible influ-
ences of firm-specific variances on the estimation results. Our portfolio analysis implies an 
investor perspective and especially considers whether a trading strategy, which buys stocks of 
corporations with a higher level of responses to climate change and sells stocks of corpora-
tions with a lower level, leads to positive or negative abnormal returns. In order to estimate 
these risk-adjusted returns, portfolio analyses have to incorporate asset pricing models. In this 
respect, we apply the four-factor model according to Carhart (1997) besides the restricted 
one-factor model based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). While the correspond-
ing factors for this flexible model are publicly available for the US and some other stock mar-
kets, they have to be calculated for the entire European stock market. This seems to be an im-
portant reason why multifactor models have not often been applied for this region yet.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: On the basis of theoretical considerations, 
the second section develops the working hypotheses for our empirical analysis. In the third 
section, we present our portfolio analysis approach and the data we used. The fourth section 
discusses the estimation results and the final section concludes. 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 General Arguments 
Portfolio analyses with an environmental focus are mostly discussed in the broader area of 
socially responsible investing (SRI), also called ethical or sustainable investments (e.g., Ren-  5
neboog et al., 2008). This investment strategy refers to the practice of choosing investments 
on the basis of social responsibility indicators (e.g., Barnett and Salomon, 2006). SRI is there-
fore not only based on environmental, but also on social screens. In this respect, the popular 
term “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) comprises both corporate social and environ-
mental activities (e.g., Waddock and Graves, 1997, Orlitzky, 2001, Orlitzky et al., 2003). Ac-
cording to the well-established definition of McWilliams and Siegel (2001), CSR are “actions 
that appear to further some social good, beyond the interest of the firm and what is required 
by law”. Another definition of CSR emphasizes – besides the avoidance of distributional con-
flicts – “actions which reduce the extent of externalized costs” (Heal, 2005). 
Overall, current theory on the relationship between corporate environmental performance or 
CSR and financial performance is rather inconclusive (e.g., Waddock and Graves, 1997, 
Guenster et al., 2006). For example, McWilliams and Siegel (2001) show within a model with 
two firms which produce identical products, where one firm adds an additional CSR attribute 
or feature to the product which is valued by the market, that in equilibrium the overall effect 
of this attribute is neutral (see also McWilliams et al., 2006). Similarly, MacKey et al. (2007) 
use a theoretical decision making model comprising the supply and demand for CSR which 
shows that environmental or social activities have in some cases no impact on the market 
value. While these studies are based on the discussion of CSR, they can also be transferred to 
general corporate environmental performance or – as in this paper – to corporate activities to 
address climate change. In our empirical analysis we consider two specific measures: First, 
‘climate impact statement’ indicates whether a firm states that climate change can lead to cor-
porate risks and/or opportunities. Therefore, this indicator displays the general relevance a 
firm attributes to climate change and the need for appropriate corporate responses. Second, 
‘carbon reduction measures’ refer to actual corporate activities to decrease CO2 or CO2 
equivalents in the production process. Therefore, this measure displays whether a firm has 
already implemented corporate responses to climate change in terms of concrete actions.   6
General arguments for a negative relationship between corporate environmental performance 
or CSR and financial performance can be based on neoclassical microeconomics. According 
to this, it is emphasized that the operating costs of corporate environmental activities (e.g., 
Telle, 2006) outweigh their financial benefits (e.g., cost reductions through energy savings), 
so that the underlying principle of shareholder wealth maximization is weakened. It is argued 
that such activities require significant portions of corporate financial resources, although their 
benefits are often in a distant future if any benefits occur. As a consequence, corporate envi-
ronmental (or social) measures can lead to reduced profits, decreased firm values, or competi-
tive disadvantage besides lower stock returns, so that already Friedman (1970) argues that 
there is no role for CSR. While this general cost argument applies for corporate carbon reduc-
tion measures, it is less clear for climate impact statements because their operating costs are 
rather marginal. 
This neoclassical rationale is supported by corporate governance theory (e.g., Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997, Tirole, 2006). According to a rather narrow definition, corporate governance 
comprises all measures – such as optimal incentive or control structures – which assure that 
investors get an adequate return for their investments. Only if corporate governance structures 
are properly installed, management will choose the profit-maximizing path. According to this, 
it can, for example, be argued that the consideration of goals of other groups – such as the 
general public – as motivation for corporate carbon reduction measures unnecessarily enlarges 
the latitude of management which could be misused for maximizing the utility of managers, 
so that the risk of counterproductive measures with respect to shareholder wealth and eco-
nomic success increases. In other words, investors have to consider lower returns on their 
investments if the respective corporations deviate from the optimal path due to excessive en-
vironmental activities (e.g., Heinkel et al., 2001, Beltratti, 2005). In contrast, investors in 
purely profit-maximizing firms with a lower intensity of such measures can expect higher 
investment returns. While this corporate governance argument generally applies for corporate   7
activities to address climate change, carbon reduction measures can lead to stronger negative 
effects on corporate financial performance than climate impact statements since they refer to 
concrete activities that potentially involve extensive investments.  
As a consequence of both the cost and the corporate governance arguments, a general nega-
tive relationship between corporate responses to climate change and financial performance – 
especially strong for carbon reduction measures – can be expected. In summary, this leads to 
Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b: 
Hypothesis 1a: The relationship between corporate responses to climate change and finan-
cial performance is generally negative. 
Hypothesis 1b: The negative relationship between corporate responses to climate change 
and financial performance is stronger for carbon reduction measures than for climate impact 
statements. 
However, positive relationships between corporate environmental performance or CSR and 
financial performance can also be based on neoclassical microeconomics by emphasizing the 
role of respective measures in reducing the extent of externalized costs. Friedman (1970) as-
sumes in his criticism on CSR that the government defines property rights, so that no external 
effects exist. In this view, corporate environmental activities that benefit shareholders are pure 
profit-maximization, while measures not benefiting investors are theft from shareholders. In 
contrast, Heal (2005) argues that the government does not fully resolve all problems with ex-
ternal effects and that the competitive markets are not efficient. Therefore, corporate envi-
ronmental (or social) activities can substitute missing markets (and thus missing regulations) 
if external costs arise from them and can reduce conflicts between firms and stakeholder 
groups such as non-governmental organizations. As a consequence, it can be argued that the 
reduction of these conflicts increases corporate profits or financial performance at least in the 
long term, which also makes firms with a high environmental performance more attractive to   8
investors. This argument for a positive relationship with corporate financial performance ap-
plies to a larger extent for corporate carbon reduction measures than for climate impact state-
ments because the latter generally do not reduce external costs. 
The stakeholder argument can be strengthened according to insights from the strategic man-
agement literature (e.g., Waddock and Graves, 1997, Barnett and Salomon, 2006). Stake-
holder theory suggests that management must satisfy several groups (e.g., the government, the 
general public, non-governmental organizations, competitors, employees, clients) that have 
some interest or “stake” in a firm and can influence its outcome (e.g., McWilliams et al., 
2006). Regarding corporate financial performance, it can therefore be worthwhile for firms to 
engage in environmental (or social) activities because otherwise these stakeholders could 
withdraw their support. For example, corporate carbon reduction measures to comply with 
regulations can lead to better relationships with government that could be beneficial for cor-
porate legislative and political lobbying which is common in climate policy (e.g., Anger et al., 
2008). Furthermore, general corporate activities to address climate change and especially con-
crete carbon reduction measures can reduce risk due to, for example, aggressive campaigns of 
non-governmental organizations.  
These arguments from stakeholder theory can be embedded in the resource-based view of the 
firm (e.g., Barney, 1991), which suggests that economic success and competitive advantage 
evolves from internal resources and capabilities that are valuable, rare, and difficult to imitate 
or substitute (e.g., Russo and Fouts, 1997, Klassen and Whybark, 1999, King and Lenox, 
2001, McWilliams et al., 2006). In this respect, stakeholder management can be considered an 
important organizational capability. Furthermore, a good reputation due to corporate activities 
to address climate change is a good example for an intangible resource. This could particu-
larly lead to higher sales among customers who are sensitive to such issues and therefore in-
crease corporate profits or financial performance. In this respect, new technologies which are   9
installed due to concrete proactive corporate carbon reduction measures are an example for a 
tangible or physical resource if these technologies can be capitalized and not easily imitated 
by competitors.  
Overall, the resource-based view of the firm and the stakeholder theory suggest – in the same 
way as the external effect argument from Heal (2005) – a positive relationship between corpo-
rate responses to climate change and financial performance, which is indeed stronger for car-
bon reduction measures than for climate impact statements. In summary, this leads to Hy-
pothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b: 
Hypothesis 2a: The relationship between corporate responses to climate change and finan-
cial performance is generally positive. 
Hypothesis 2b: The positive relationship between corporate responses to climate change and 
financial performance is stronger for carbon reduction measures than for climate impact 
statements. 
2.2 Impact of Climate Policy 
Based on these general considerations, we especially argue that the underlying climate policy 
regime can have strong impacts on the financial performance of corporations or entire indus-
tries. Against this background, a recent study of Oberndorfer (2008) considers the effect of 
the EU Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) on the stock performance of 
European electricity corporations. According to this, EU Emission Allowance (EUA) price 
changes and stock returns are positively related. However, we do not analyze the direct effect 
of climate policy on corporate financial performance, but whether it has different financial 
relevance for firms which react to climate change and firms which do not react. In this re-
spect, it seems plausible that the stakeholder theory argument as discussed above is strength-
ened when climate change legislation is stringent. Compared with – for a long time – rather   10
weak regulations (e.g., Böhringer and Vogt, 2004), such climate policy regimes, which are 
accompanied by a social climate demanding corporate responses to climate change, imply that 
good relationships with stakeholders such as the general public or non-governmental organi-
zations can especially be negatively affected if firms do not react. In this case a good reputa-
tion due to corporate responses to climate change seems to be a more important intangible 
resource than in an unambitious climate policy regime. 
Similarly, the cost argument, as discussed above, implying a negative relationship between 
corporate activities to address climate change and financial performance can be weakened if 
more stringent climate policy leads to higher operating costs when firms do not react to cli-
mate change. For example, the introduction of the EU ETS has assigned a monetary value to 
CO2 emissions in Europe and leads to higher expenditures for firms that are covered by the 
scheme and whose actual emissions exceed the emission allowances freely allocated to them 
(in the first phase of the EU ETS, grandfathering, i.e. free allocation, is the dominant mecha-
nism for emission allowance allocation). Furthermore, firms can sell the allowances freely 
allocated to them and therefore realize revenues instead of emitting CO2. As a consequence, 
the difference between operating costs of corporate responses to climate change and their fi-
nancial benefits is now smaller than before because the benefits comprise the prevented ex-
penditures for the emission allowances. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that both the 
strengthening of the stakeholder argument and the weakening of the cost argument through 
more stringent climate policy benefits firms which react to climate change. When these bene-
fits are financially relevant, it can be expected that the relationship between corporate re-
sponses to climate change and financial performance is more positive in an ambitious climate 
policy regime than with unambitious climate change regulations. 
An analysis of US climate policy until recently – and especially over the entire observation 
period from 2001 to 2006 – shows that the corresponding climate policy framework is rather   11
weak. Before 2007 (i.e. before the Conference of Parties, COP, in Bali), the US government 
challenged anthropogenic climate change and thus dismissed the necessity to reinforce a re-
duction of greenhouse gas emissions by legislation. Similarly, climate policy in Europe was 
not fundamentally different in the first half of this period, even when the debate on climate 
change measures clearly began earlier than in the USA. In December 2003, however, the 
European Commission stated that the EU was likely to miss its greenhouse gas emission tar-
gets under the Kyoto Protocol and rigorously sharpened its climate policy. Based on this, the 
EU member states were requested to implement additional climate change regulations. There-
fore, the end of 2003 can be considered a tipping point at which it became very clear that 
firms in Europe would soon face more stringent climate change legislation, even though the 
EU ETS was not launched until the beginning of 2005.  
As a consequence, the strengthening of the stakeholder argument and the weakening of the 
cost argument as discussed above is particularly relevant for Europe in the years after 2003. In 
summary, this leads to the following Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4: 
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between corporate responses to climate change and financial 
performance is more positive in Europe than in the USA. 
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between corporate responses to climate change and financial 
performance in Europe becomes more positive over time. 
3. Portfolio Analysis Approach and Data 
3.1 Methodological Approach 
In order to examine these hypotheses, we perform a portfolio analysis which compares the 
average stock performance of portfolios comprising corporations that differ in their responses 
to climate change. In line with recent studies (e.g., Derwall et al., 2005, Bauer et al., 2005, 
2007, Kempf and Osthoff, 2007) we consider the risk-adjusted returns of different stock port-  12
folios that are estimated on the basis of asset pricing models. So far, the traditional asset pric-
ing model is the one-factor model based on the market model (e.g., Sharpe, 1963) and the 
CAPM (e.g., Lintner, 1965, Fama and French, 2004, Perold, 2004). This model can be formu-
lated for a portfolio i in month t (i = 1,…,N; t = 1,…,T) as: 
    rit – rft = αi + βi (rmt – rft) + εit 
In this approach rit and rmt are the (continuous) stock returns of corporation i and the market at 
the end of month t, rft is the risk-free interest rate at the beginning of month t, and εit is the 
disturbance term with E(εit) = 0 and (unknown) var(εit) = σε
2. Finally, the one-factor alpha αi 
(i.e. Jensen’s alpha) and βi are further unknown parameters which are estimated by ordinary 
least squares (OLS). It is assumed that βi capture the non-diversifiable risk of each stock port-
folio in the explanation of the excess returns rit-rft.  
Based on the “anomalies” discussion which questions the validity of the CAPM (e.g., Banz, 
1981, DeBondt and Thaler, 1985, Fama and French, 1992), Fama and French (1993) devel-
oped a three-factor model which includes – besides the excess returns rmt-rft of the market – 
two additional factors with respect to size and value to explain the excess returns rit-rft. Many 
empirical studies show that this three-factor model has more explanatory power than the one-
factor model based on the CAPM, for example, Fama and French (1993, 1996) for the US, 
Berkowitz and Qiu (2001) for the Canadian, Hussain et al. (2002) for the British, and 
Schrimpf et al. (2007) or Ziegler et al. (2007b) for the German stock market. At the same 
time, however, a broad discussion about another factor, namely the momentum factor, began 
(e.g., Jagadeesh and Titman, 1993, Rouwenhorst, 1998, Jagadeesh and Titman, 2001). As a 
consequence, the following four-factor model of Carhart (1997), which additionally includes 
this factor besides the three Fama-French factors, is the most common asset pricing model for 
applications in financial economics (e.g., L’Her et al., 2004, Bollen and Busse, 2005) and 
especially for SRI portfolio analyses:   13
    rit – rft = αi + βi1 (rmt – rft) + βi2 SMBt + βi3 HMLt + βi4 MOMt + εit 
In this model the Fama-French size factor SMBt is (at the end of month t) the difference be-
tween the returns of portfolios comprising stocks of “small” corporations and portfolios com-
prising stocks of “big” corporations. The Fama-French value factor HMLt is (at the end of 
month t) the difference between the returns of portfolios comprising stocks of firms with a 
“high” book-to-market equity and portfolios comprising stocks of firms with a “low” book-to-
market equity. Finally, the Carhart momentum factor MOMt is (at the end of month t) the dif-
ference between the returns of portfolios comprising stocks of “winners” in the past and port-
folios comprising stocks of “losers” in the past. The unknown parameters are now the four-
factor alpha αi as well as βi1, βi2, βi3, and βi4 besides var(εit) = σε
2 which are again estimated 
by OLS. 
The main interesting parameter in both approaches is αi, which is interpreted as the average 
monthly risk-adjusted or abnormal return of stock portfolio i that cannot be explained by the 
single risk factor in the one-factor model based on the CAPM or the four risk factors in the 
Carhart multifactor model. It is thus treated as a measure for stock return out- or underper-
formance of portfolios comprising corporations with a higher or lower level of responses to 
climate change compared with the stock market. Furthermore, we consider a trading strategy 
which buys stocks of corporations with a higher level of responses to climate change and sells 
stocks of corporations with a lower level of responses to climate change. For this analysis we 
examine returns of stock portfolios which are constructed by the difference between the re-
turns of stock portfolios comprising firms with a higher level of responses to climate change 
and the returns of stock portfolios comprising corporations with a lower level. The corre-
sponding aggregated parameter can be calculated by the difference between the two separated 
one- or four-factor alphas αi.    14
3.2 Data for Corporate Responses to Climate Change  
Recent SRI portfolio analyses, which compare the risk-adjusted returns of stock portfolios 
that differ in environmental and/or social measures, either refer to existing funds or virtual 
funds constructed by the researcher. While the first approach (e.g., Bauer et al., 2005, 2007) is 
more appropriate to examine real investment decisions, it has the drawback that the effect of 
fund management skills cannot be separated from the SRI effect. In this respect, portfolio 
analyses on the basis of virtual funds seem to be more attractive. However, one problem of 
former portfolio analyses is that the driving factors for possible positive or negative relations 
cannot be clearly identified among the multitude of aggregated environmental and social rat-
ings, for example, from KLD Research & Analytics (e.g., Kempf and Osthoff, 2007). This 
problem even remains for portfolio analyses that are only based on aggregated environmental 
measures, for example, from Innovest (e.g., Derwall et al., 2005).  
In contrast to these studies, we use specific disaggregated time series data for corporate envi-
ronmental performance from the Swiss company ASSET4. This firm is a world-wide leading 
provider of impartial and measurable extra-financial information of firms. The in-depth in-
formation comprises several corporate economic, environmental, social, and governance 
measures. Based on this, ASSET4 constructs, for each firm, economic, environmental, social, 
and governance ratings as well as an aggregated overall rating. The main advantage of the raw 
data is that they are exclusively taken from publicly available sources such as annual reports. 
In contrast, former SRI portfolio analyses, for example, based on data from Innovest or KLD 
Research & Analytics include highly subjective elements. ASSET4 has gathered data from 
world-wide leading firms, including the S&P 500, Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) Europe, and FTSE 350 corporations for the period from 2001 to 2006. In the future, 
ASSET4 will cover the entire MSCI World Index.   15
Due to the focus of our study, we consider unique measures for corporate responses to climate 
change. In this respect, ASSET4 has first investigated a corporate measure for climate impact 
attention based on the question: “Does the company make a clear statement that it believes 
that climate change can represent commercial risks and/or opportunities?”. Second, ASSET4 
has explored an indicator for corporate carbon reduction measures based on the question: 
“Does the company report on initiatives or new production techniques, to recycle, reduce, 
reuse, substitute or phase out CO2 or CO2 equivalents in the production process?”. In this 
respect, the number of world-wide firms for which such information is available (and 
appropriate) increases from 614 in 2001 to 1790 in 2006 for the first measure and from 447 in 
2001 to 1372 in 2006 for the second indicator. 
3.3 Financial Data and Variables 
In our separated portfolio analysis for Europe and the USA we indeed examine those 
corporations with this information which were members of the MSCI Europe Index or the 
MSCI USA Index at least once in the period from 2001 to 2006. The corresponding financial 
data on total return indexes (which contain both stock prices and cash flows to the investor), 
market values, and book values (in US $, respectively) stem from Thomson Financial Data-
stream. We calculated the monthly stock returns (in %) of all European and US corporations 
in the empirical analysis with these total return indexes. The time-series regressions of the 
asset pricing models also require the inclusion of a risk-free interest rate. In this respect, we 
used the monthly return of one-month US Treasury Bills. Furthermore, the regressions addi-
tionally require the inclusion of the monthly excess returns rmt-rft. For the USA we directly 
used the corresponding data (in %) from the Kenneth R. French data library. Our calculation 
of the monthly returns rmt of a European stock market portfolio (in %) is based on the total 
return indexes of the MSCI Europe (in US $).   16
In the same way as rmt-rft we directly extracted the factors SMBt, HMLt, and MOMt for the US 
stock market from the Kenneth R. French data library. In contrast, these factors are not pub-
licly available for the entire European stock market and thus had to be constructed based on 
several stock portfolios. The basis for this construction was built by all European corporations 
which were member of the MSCI Europe at least once in the period from 2001 to 2006. Re-
garding SMBt and HMLt, firms were ranked each year on their market capitalization in June 
and independently on their ratio between the published book value for the last year and the 
market value in December of the last year. Then the median of the market capitalizations as 
well as the 30% and 70% percentiles of the book-to-market value ratios were calculated, so 
that six portfolios could be constructed from these three values. In each June over time the 
corporations were allocated again to one of these six portfolios and stay there from July for 
the next 12 months.  
These portfolios only comprise those corporations with corresponding available data for June 
of the respective year and additionally with positive book values for the last year. Further-
more, stock return and market value data for the next 12 months had to be available. The re-
sulting times-series of the monthly value-weighted returns of these six stock portfolios (from 
January 2001 to June 2006) were the basis for the final calculations of SMBt, which is the 
(weighted) difference between the monthly stock returns of “small” corporations and “big” 
corporations, as well as HMLt, which is the (weighted) difference between the monthly stock 
returns of corporations with a “high” book-to-market equity and the monthly stock returns of 
corporations with a “low” book-to-market equity (according to the procedure of Fama and 
French, 1993).  
Concerning MOMt, corporations were ranked in each month t-1 on their market capitalization 
and independently on the average stock returns between the months t-12 and t-2. Then the 
median of the market capitalizations as well as the 30% and 70% percentiles of the average   17
stock returns were calculated leading to six portfolios based on these three values. The firms 
were allocated again in each month t-1 over time to one of these six portfolios. The construc-
tion of these portfolios only incorporates those corporations with an available market value 
for this and the next month and additionally with available stock returns for the next month t 
and for each month between t-12 and t-2. The resulting times-series of the monthly value-
weighted returns of four portfolios with respect to the bottom and top 30% of the past average 
stock returns were the basis of the final calculations of MOMt, which is the (weighted) differ-
ence between the monthly returns of “winners” in the past and the monthly returns of “losers” 
in the past (according to the procedure described on the Kenneth R. French data library). 
3.4 Construction of Portfolios on Corporate Responses to Climate Change 
Subsequently, we had to construct the average stock returns across several corporations in our 
portfolios that refer to different responses to climate change for both regions as discussed 
above. In this respect, the corporations were allocated again in each year over time to a port-
folio ‘climate impact statement’ and to a portfolio ‘no climate impact statement’. Similarly, 
the corporations were allocated again in each year to a portfolio ‘carbon reduction measures’ 
and to a portfolio ‘no carbon reduction measures’. Furthermore, we constructed two portfolios 
based on the aggregation of both indicators for corporate activities to address climate change. 
In other words, the corporations were allocated again in each year to a portfolio ‘both corpo-
rate responses’ incorporating firms with both a climate impact statement and additionally car-
bon reduction measures as well as to a portfolio ‘no corporate response’ comprising firms that 
neither make such a statement nor perform carbon reduction measures. 
The corresponding corporations stay in these six portfolios for all 12 months of the following 
calendar year. Moreover, the first indicators for corporate responses to climate change for the 
year 2001 are also used for the allocation of the portfolios in 2001 besides 2002. The portfo-
lios only include those firms for which such information is available in the respective years   18
and which – as discussed above – were member of the MSCI Europe Index or the MSCI USA 
Index at least once in the period from 2001 to 2006. Furthermore, stock return data for the 
respective months had to be available. Table 1 reports the corresponding numbers of corpora-
tions in the different portfolios for each year from 2001 to 2006. According to this, the num-
bers increase over time in each portfolio of both regions which – as discussed above – is due 
to the rising number of firms for which data for corporate responses to climate change are 
available. Moreover, it can be seen that the portfolios ‘climate impact statement’, ‘carbon 
reduction measures’, and ‘both corporate responses’ comprise clearly smaller numbers of 
firms than the other portfolios. 
Based on this, we received for both the European and the US stock market a time series of 
monthly returns of these six stock portfolios which were calculated with the average stock 
returns across all corporations in the respective portfolios. Even when these time series are 
available from January 2001 to December 2006, we only examine the period until June 2006 
since the time series for SMBt and HMLt are only available for the European stock market 
over this period. Table 1 additionally reports the corresponding average monthly stock returns 
of the portfolios for the entire observation period from 2001 to 2006 as well as for the sub-
periods from 2001 to 2003 and from 2004 to 2006. According to this, these average returns 
strongly increase over time for all six portfolios in both regions, respectively. 
Finally, we additionally constructed for the two disaggregated and the aggregated corporate 
response indicators “long-short” portfolios. These portfolios are based on a trading strategy 
which buys stocks of corporations with a higher level of responses to climate change and sells 
stocks of corporations with a lower level. For the aggregated indicators, for example, this 
means that stocks of corporations with a clear statement that climate change can represent 
commercial risks and/or opportunities and additionally with initiatives or new production 
techniques to recycle, reduce, reuse, substitute or phase out CO2 or CO2 equivalents in the   19
production process are bought and stocks of corporations with none of these activities are 
sold. The time series of the monthly returns of the three “long-short” stock portfolios can be 
calculated by the differences between the monthly returns of the ‘climate impact statement’ 
and ‘no climate impact statement’ stock portfolios, between the ‘carbon reduction measures’ 
and ‘no carbon reduction measures’ stock portfolios, as well as between the ‘both corporate 
responses’ and ‘no corporate response’ stock portfolios. 
4. Results  
Table 2 and Table 3 report the estimation results for the different portfolios regarding corpo-
rate climate impact statements. The “long-short” portfolios here refer to a trading strategy 
which goes long in the ‘climate impact statement’ portfolio and short in the ‘no climate im-
pact statement’ portfolio. The tables show the estimation results for the entire observation 
period from 2001 to 2006 as well as for the sub-periods from 2001 to 2003 and from 2004 to 
2006. While Table 2 refers to the European stock market, Table 3 corresponds to the US stock 
market. The first row for each portfolio refers to the one-factor model based on the CAPM 
and the second row to the Carhart four-factor model. Similarly, Table 4 and Table 5 report the 
corresponding estimation results for the different portfolios which are based on corporate car-
bon reduction measures. The “long-short” portfolios here refer to a trading strategy which 
goes long in the ‘carbon reduction measures’ portfolio and short in the ‘no carbon reduction 
measures’ portfolio. Finally, Table 6 and Table 7 report the respective estimation results 
based on the aggregated corporate response indicators. The “long-short” portfolios here refer 
to a trading strategy which goes long in the ‘both corporate responses’ portfolio and short in 
the ‘no corporate response’ portfolio. 
Regarding the entire observation period from 2001 to 2006, the first four tables of the estima-
tion results (i.e., Table 2, Table 3, Table 4, Table 5) report some significant abnormal returns. 
According to Table 2 and Table 3, for example, the portfolio including corporations which   20
make no clear statement that they believe that climate change can represent commercial risks 
and/or opportunities outperforms the stock market both in Europe and in the USA at least at 
the 5% significance level. Furthermore, Table 4 and Table 5 show that also the ‘carbon reduc-
tion measures’ portfolio outperforms the stock market in both regions at the 5% significance 
level. However, it should be emphasized that these results (in the same way as the signifi-
cantly positive abnormal return for the ‘no carbon reduction measures’ portfolio in Europe 
according to Table 4) only apply in the one-factor model based on the CAPM. In contrast, all 
these apparently significantly risk-adjusted returns become insignificant in the multifactor 
model. Since the size, book-to-market equity, and momentum factors (besides the excess re-
turns of the market) often have significant effects on the excess returns rit-rft of stock portfo-
lios in both regions, these estimation results support the high relevance and stronger reliability 
of the application of the Carhart four-factor model compared with the restricted one-factor 
model based on the CAPM. As a consequence, the results of our portfolio analysis cannot 
confirm Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 2b due to the generally insignificant relationships be-
tween the individual corporate responses to climate change and financial performance, respec-
tively.  
In contrast, Table 6 and Table 7 report significantly negative abnormal returns for the ‘both 
corporate responses’ stock portfolio in Europe and for the “long-short” strategy in both re-
gions in the Carhart four-factor model, respectively. Therefore, a trading strategy, which 
bought stocks of corporations that made a clear statement that climate change can represent 
commercial risks and/or opportunities and additionally reported initiatives or new production 
techniques regarding CO2 and sold stocks of corporations with none of these activities, led to 
negative abnormal returns over the entire observation period from 2001 to 2006. According to 
this, our estimation results provide some evidence to support Hypothesis 1a and to reject Hy-
pothesis 2a due to the rather negative relationship between corporate responses to climate 
change and financial performance. Regarding the comparison between both regions, the esti-  21
mated four-factor alpha is clearly more negative for the European than for the US stock mar-
ket (and additionally statistically more robust based on the underlying 5% and 10% signifi-
cance levels). While the estimated average monthly risk-adjusted return amounts to -1.20% in 
Europe, the corresponding value amounts to only -0.44% in the USA. As a consequence, Hy-
pothesis 3 must generally be rejected according to these results. 
However, the estimation results for the European stock market strongly change over time. 
According to Table 6, the ‘both corporate responses’ portfolio underperforms the stock mar-
ket and – as indicated by the “long-short” strategy – also the ‘no corporate climate response’ 
portfolio in the first sub-period from 2001 to 2003, but outperforms them in the second sub-
period from 2004 to 2006 at least at the 5% significance level in the Carhart four-factor 
model, respectively. Considering the individual corporate activities to address climate change, 
Table 2 and Table 4 show that these significant risk-adjusted returns especially stem from the 
respective returns with respect to the carbon reduction measures. While Table 2 reports that 
the four-factor alphas for the “long-short” strategy with respect to a clear statement that cli-
mate change can represent commercial risks and/or opportunities are not significantly differ-
ent from zero, Table 4 shows that these abnormal returns are negative in the sub-period from 
2001 to 2003 and positive in the sub-period from 2004 to 2006 and additionally differ from 
zero at the 10% significance level, respectively, for reported initiatives or new production 
techniques regarding CO2. Due to this development over time, our estimation results support 
Hypothesis 4. 
In this respect, it should be noted that some significant abnormal returns in the one-factor 
model based on the CAPM become – similar to the entire observation period from 2001 to 
2006 as discussed above – insignificant in the Carhart four-factor model, while at the same 
time several factors have significant effects on the excess returns rit-rft. This result also holds 
for the two sub-periods in the USA according to Table 3 and Table 5, which strengthens the   22
importance of the application of this multifactor model. Regarding the first sub-period from 
2001 to 2003, Table 3, Table 5, and Table 7 report no significant abnormal returns for the US 
stock market in the multifactor model. In contrast, Table 3 shows that the ‘no climate impact 
statement’ portfolio outperforms the stock market at the 1% significance level and – as indi-
cated by the “long-short” strategy – the ‘climate impact statement’ portfolio at the 10% sig-
nificance level in the second sub-period from 2004 to 2006. Furthermore, the ‘both corporate 
responses’ portfolio underperforms the stock market at the 10% significance level and – again 
as indicated by the “long-short” strategy – the ‘no corporate responses’ portfolio at the 1% 
significance level in this period according to Table 7. As a consequence, our estimation re-
sults provide some evidence to support Hypothesis 3 if only the sub-period from 2004 to 2006 
was examined, although the general rejection of this hypothesis for the entire observation pe-
riod from 2001 to 2006 as discussed above persists.  
5. Conclusions 
Our portfolio analysis implies that a trading strategy, which bought stocks of corporations 
with both considered responses to climate change and sold stocks of corporations with no 
responses to climate change over the entire observation period from 2001 to 2006, led to es-
timated losses in the average monthly risk-adjusted returns in the amount of 0.44% for the US 
stock market and in the amount of 1.20% for the European stock market. According to this, 
such specific “green investments” were penalized by the stock markets. Due to this negative 
relationship, additional activities to address climate change do not seem to be specific factors 
for firms to become economically more successful. In this respect, sceptics such as Friedman 
(1970), who argues that there is no role for corporate environmental activities or CSR beyond 
profit-maximizing actions, are supported. Furthermore, our empirical analysis does not en-
courage advocates of information-based environmental or climate policy instead of other 
market based instruments – such as green taxes – or mandatory command and control regula-  23
tions because we cannot support a positive relationship between corporate responses to cli-
mate change and financial performance. 
However, the main result of our portfolio analysis refers to the role of the underlying climate 
policy regime. While we do not directly analyze the effects of climate policy, for example, 
measured by pollution abatement expenditures (e.g., Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003), on cor-
porate financial performance, we contribute to the discussion of the impact of environmental 
policy on the relationship between corporate environmental and financial performance with 
the separated consideration of the US and European stock markets and the additional exami-
nation of different sub-periods. For Europe we find that a trading strategy, which bought 
stocks of corporations with both examined responses to climate change and sold stocks of 
corporations with no responses to climate change, indeed led to negative abnormal returns in 
the period from 2001 to 2003, but to positive abnormal returns in the period from 2004 to 
2006. In contrast, such a trading strategy produced negative abnormal returns for the US stock 
market in the latter period.  
According to this, the financial performance of firms with a higher level of responses to cli-
mate change is clearly more positive in regions and periods – such as Europe since 2004 – 
with stringent climate policy than in regions and periods – such as the USA from 2004 to 
2006 – with weak climate policy. Regarding the investor perspective, these results suggest 
investing in corporations with a higher level of responses to climate change especially in re-
gions with more ambitious climate policy regimes. Since the stringency of climate policy can 
be expected to further increase in Europe, but especially in the USA due to the announce-
ments of the new administration under President Obama, such investments could generally 
become more attractive in the future. Based on this, it can also be expected that corresponding 
corporate activities become worthwhile. Regarding policy itself, the aforementioned criticism 
on advocates of information-based climate policy is strengthened as only a stringent climate   24
policy regime, for example, based on ambitious emission trading systems, leads to positive 
relationships between corporate activities to address climate change and financial perform-
ance. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Europe  USA 
  Climate impact    
statement 
No climate impact   
statement 
Climate impact    
statement 
No climate impact   
statement 
Numbers of corporations in the stock portfolios 
2001  14 171 17 142 
2002  17 210 17 179 
2003  40 355 23 294 
2004  42 402 33 334 
2005  60 431 36 424 
2006  89 410 62 453 
Average monthly returns of the stock portfolios 
2001-2006  0.03% 0.67% 0.23% 0.36% 
2001-2003  -1.13% -0.07% -0.06% 0.06% 
2004-2006  1.43% 1.57% 0.56% 0.71% 








Numbers of corporations in the stock portfolios 
2001  44 87 31 90 
2002  51 114 32 115 
2003  43 249 29 213 
2004  69 259 34 240 
2005  85 282 43 300 
2006  115  273 59 330 
Average monthly returns of the stock portfolios 
2001-2006  0.59% 0.76% 0.55% 0.32% 
2001-2003 -0.31%  0.12%  0.08%  0.07% 
2004-2006  1.68% 1.54% 1.12% 0.61% 
 Both  corporate 
responses 




No corporate        
responses 
Numbers of corporations in the stock portfolios 
2001  6 84 9 83 
2002  7 110 9 108 
2003  11 230 16 205 
2004  15 238 20 227 
2005  29 262 24 265 
2006  41 242 30 274 
Average monthly returns in the stock portfolios 
2001-2006  -0.34% 0.76% -0.08% 0.32% 
2001-2003  -1.81% 0.11% -0.44% 0.04% 
2004-2006  1.46% 1.54% 0.35% 0.66%   31
Table 2: Parameter estimates (z-statistics) for the European stock market, portfolios accord-
ing to climate impact statement 
2001-2006 
 Alpha  rmt – rit  SMBt  HMLt  MOMt  R
2 
Climate 
impact    
statement 
-0.13           
(-0.59) 
-0.20           
(-0.89) 
1.22
***          
(17.59) 
1.04
***          
(22.22) 
--              
(--) 
0.12            
(1.44) 
--              
(--) 
0.21        
(1.38) 
--              
(--) 
-0.20





impact    
statement 
0.50
***          
(2.87) 
0.06            
(0.50) 
1.12
***         
(22.02) 
1.05
***       
(46.92) 
--              
(--) 
0.44
***          
(10.75) 
--              
(--) 
0.17
***      
(3.23) 
--              
(--) 
-0.09







***         
(-2.64) 
-0.26           
(-0.98) 
0.11            
(1.57) 
-0.00          
(-0.07) 
--              
(--) 
-0.32
***         
(-3.43) 
--              
(--) 
0.04            
(0.24) 
--              
(--) 
-0.15





 Alpha  rmt – rit  SMBt  HMLt  MOMt  R
2 
Climate 
impact    
statement 
-0.28           
(-0.76) 
-0.41           
(-1.19) 
1.24
***          
(15.19) 
0.98
***          
(12.36) 
--              
(--) 
0.10            
(1.14) 
--              
(--) 
0.20         
(1.03) 
--              
(--) 
-0.28





impact    
statement 
0.66
**        
(2.42) 
0.13            
(0.64) 
1.12
***         
(18.63) 
1.03
***       
(31.98) 
--              
(--) 
0.41
***          
(8.71) 
--              
(--) 
0.17
**      
(2.41) 
--              
(--) 
-0.10







**          
(-2.46) 
-0.55           
(-1.25) 
0.12            
(1.53) 
-0.06           
(-0.61) 
--              
(--) 
-0.31
***         
(-2.82) 
--              
(--) 
0.03   
         
(0.16) 
--              
(--) 
-0.18





 Alpha  rmt – rit  SMBt  HMLt  MOMt  R
2 
Climate 
impact    
statement 
0.18          
(1.19) 
0.03            
(0.18) 
1.11
***          
(29.34) 
1.09
***          
(17.09) 
--              
(--) 
0.14            
(0.76) 
--              
(--) 
0.15            
(0.88) 
--              
(--) 





impact    
statement 
0.27
*         
(1.69) 
-0.04           
(-0.75) 
1.16
***         
(28.17) 
1.05
***       
(42.99) 
--              
(--) 
0.58
***          
(9.65) 
--              
(--) 
0.13
**          
(2.36) 
--              
(--) 






-0.09           
(-0.52) 
0.07            
(0.49) 
-0.05          
(-0.98) 
0.05           
(0.77) 
--              
(--) 
-0.43
**          
(-2.07) 
--              
(--) 
0.01            
(0.07) 
--              
(--) 





* (**, ***) means that the appropriate parameter is different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) significance level, 
respectively.   32
Table 3: Parameter estimates (z-statistics) for the US stock market, portfolios according to 
climate impact statement 
2001-2006 
 Alpha  rmt – rit  SMBt  HMLt  MOMt  R
2 
Climate 
impact    
statement 
0.19          
(0.74) 
-0.22           
(-1.06) 
0.87
***          
(10.38) 
0.97
***          
(12.32) 
--              
(--) 
0.01            
(0.11) 
--              
(--) 
0.50
***        
(6.58) 
--              
(--) 





impact    
statement 
0.30
**          
(2.36) 
0.05            
(0.43) 
0.93
***         
(20.61) 
1.00
***       
(31.77) 
--              
(--) 
0.07
**          
(2.06) 
--              
(--) 
0.23
***      
(4.20) 
--              
(--) 






-0.11           
(-0.55) 
-0.27           
(-1.38) 
-0.05           
(-0.95) 
-0.03           
(-0.44) 
--              
(--) 
-0.06           
(-0.95) 
--              
(--) 
0.27
***          
(3.39) 
--              
(--) 





 Alpha  rmt – rit  SMBt  HMLt  MOMt  R
2 
Climate 
impact    
statement 
0.29          
(0.93) 
-0.17           
(-0.46) 
0.88
***          
(8.99) 
0.99
***          
(8.66) 
--              
(--) 
0.03            
(0.30) 
--              
(--) 
0.53
***        
(5.62) 
--              
(--) 





impact    
statement 
0.38
*       
(1.84) 
0.09           
(0.47) 
0.91
***         
(17.65) 
1.00
***       
(23.94) 
--              
(--) 
0.06            
(1.18) 
--              
(--) 
0.30
***      
(5.83) 
--              
(--) 






-0.10           
(-0.32) 
-0.25           
(-0.77) 
-0.03          
(-0.44) 
-0.02          
(-0.20) 
--              
(--) 
-0.03          
(-0.36) 
--              
(--) 
0.23
**          
(2.51) 
--              
(--) 





 Alpha  rmt – rit  SMBt  HMLt  MOMt  R
2 
Climate 
impact    
statement 
0.09          
(0.40) 
-0.20           
(-0.76) 
0.86
***          
(9.94) 
1.02
***          
(7.18) 
--              
(--) 
-0.14           
(-1.18) 
--              
(--) 
0.30
**          
(2.16) 
--              
(--) 





impact    
statement 
0.12         
(1.29) 
0.30
***          
(3.53) 
1.06
***         
(30.99) 
0.95
***       
(17.57) 
--              
(--) 
0.12
**          
(2.03) 
--              
(--) 
-0.16
***         
(-3.96) 
--              
(--) 






-0.03           
(-0.13) 
-0.50
*          
(-1.94) 
-0.20
**          
(-2.10) 
0.07           
(0.56) 
--              
(--) 
-0.25
**          
(-2.34) 
--              
(--) 
0.46
***          
(3.50) 
--              
(--) 





* (**, ***) means that the appropriate parameter is different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) significance level, 
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Table 4: Parameter estimates (z-statistics) for the European stock market, portfolios accord-
ing to carbon reduction measures 
2001-2006 
 Alpha  rmt – rit  SMBt  HMLt  MOMt  R
2 




**          
(2.27) 
-0.06           
(-0.36) 
1.04
***          
(15.00) 
1.00
***          
(29.70) 
--              
(--) 
0.38
***          
(8.58) 
--              
(--) 
0.26
**        
(2.09) 
--              
(--) 








***          
(3.09) 
0.16            
(1.22) 
1.02
***         
(20.73) 
0.97
***       
(43.52) 
--              
(--) 
0.53
***        
(12.58) 
--              
(--) 
0.05           
(0.88) 
--              
(--) 
-0.06






-0.17           
(-1.03) 
-0.22           
(-0.99) 
0.02            
(0.29) 
0.03            
(0.68) 
--              
(--) 
-0.15
***        
(-2.86) 
--              
(--) 
0.21
           
(1.50) 
--              
(--) 





 Alpha  rmt – rit  SMBt  HMLt  MOMt  R
2 
Carbon   
reduction 
measures 
0.36          
(1.24) 
-0.29           
(-1.07) 
1.03
***          
(12.79) 
1.03
***          
(21.69) 
--              
(--) 
0.40
***          
(8.44) 
--              
(--) 
0.29
**         
(2.02) 
--              
(--) 








**        
(2.55) 
0.27            
(1.41) 
1.00
***         
(17.61) 
0.92
***       
(38.39) 
--              
(--) 
0.49
***       
(12.11) 
--              
(--) 
0.01         
(0.13) 
--              
(--) 
-0.09






-0.40           
(-1.61) 
-0.56
*          
(-1.88) 
0.03            
(0.51) 
0.11
**          
(2.20) 
--              
(--) 
-0.08
*          
(-1.88) 
--              
(--) 
0.28
*          
(1.89) 
--              
(--) 





 Alpha  rmt – rit  SMBt  HMLt  MOMt  R
2 




***          
(2.91) 
0.23
*           
(1.85) 
1.04
***          
(20.31) 
1.00
***          
(23.37) 
--              
(--) 
0.40
***          
(4.47) 
--              
(--) 
0.17
*         
(1.82) 
--              
(--) 
-0.21







0.24         
(1.25) 
-0.08           
(-0.81) 
1.16
***         
(22.68) 
1.03
***       
(27.86) 
--              
(--) 
0.65
***          
(8.88) 
--              
(--) 
0.09            
(1.05) 
--              
(--) 






0.27            
(1.58) 
0.31
*           
(1.83) 
-0.12
***         
(-2.82) 
-0.04           
(-0.60) 
--              
(--) 
-0.25
**          
(-2.15) 
--              
(--) 
0.07          
(0.65) 
--              
(--) 
-0.18





* (**, ***) means that the appropriate parameter is different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) significance level, 
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Table 5: Parameter estimates (z-statistics) for the US stock market, portfolios according to 
carbon reduction measures 
2001-2006 
 Alpha  rmt – rit  SMBt  HMLt  MOMt  R
2 




**          
(2.12) 
0.20          
(0.95) 
0.87
***          
(10.63) 
0.96
***          
(12.11) 
--              
(--) 
-0.07           
(-0.92) 
--              
(--) 
0.46
***         
(4.93) 
--              
(--) 







0.27          
(1.62) 
-0.08           
(-0.52) 
0.92
***         
(17.06) 
0.98
***       
(26.94) 
--              
(--) 
0.14
***        
(2.77) 
--              
(--) 
0.27
***      
(4.70) 
--              
(--) 






0.24            
(1.10) 
0.28            
(1.32) 
-0.05           
(-0.77) 
-0.02          
(-0.23) 
--              
(--) 
-0.22
**          
(-2.52) 
--              
(--) 
0.19
**       
(2.04) 
--              
(--) 





 Alpha  rmt – rit  SMBt  HMLt  MOMt  R
2 
Carbon   
reduction 
measures 
0.41          
(1.05) 
0.18          
(0.53) 
0.86
***          
(9.18) 
0.90
***          
(7.62) 
--              
(--) 
-0.13           
(-1.26) 
--              
(--) 
0.48
***         
(4.35) 
--              
(--) 







0.40        
(1.50) 
-0.04           
(-0.17) 
0.89
***         
(14.43) 
0.99
***       
(22.18) 
--              
(--) 
0.13
*        
(1.76) 
--              
(--) 
0.35
***      
(5.86) 
--              
(--) 






0.01            
(0.02) 
0.22            
(0.62) 
-0.03          
(-0.40) 
-0.09          
(-0.85) 
--              
(--) 
-0.25
**          
(-2.30) 
--              
(--) 
0.13         
(1.10) 
--              
(--) 





 Alpha  rmt – rit  SMBt  HMLt  MOMt  R
2 




**          
(2.44) 
0.24            
(0.74) 
0.89
***          
(8.44) 
0.99
***          
(6.75) 
--              
(--) 
-0.01           
(-0.07) 
--              
(--) 
0.45
***         
(2.89) 
--              
(--) 







0.00         
(0.02) 
0.18            
(1.06) 
1.10
***         
(18.89) 
0.95
***       
(9.37) 
--              
(--) 
0.17
*           
(1.79) 
--              
(--) 
-0.16
*          
(-1.71) 
--              
(--) 







**          
(2.55) 
0.05            
(0.26) 
-0.21
**          
(-1.99) 
0.05           
(0.44) 
--              
(--) 
-0.18          
(-1.44) 
--              
(--) 
0.62
***       
(5.73) 
--              
(--) 





* (**, ***) means that the appropriate parameter is different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) significance level, 
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Table 6: Parameter estimates (z-statistics) for the European stock market, portfolios accord-
ing to both corporate responses to climate change (i.e. climate impact statement and carbon 
reduction measures) 
2001-2006 
 Alpha  rmt – rit  SMBt  HMLt  MOMt  R
2 
Both      
corporate 
responses 
-0.43           
(-0.95) 
-1.04
**          
(-2.07) 
1.23
***          
(8.35) 
1.01
***          
(11.41) 
--              
(--) 
0.80
***          
(5.65) 
--              
(--) 
0.20        
(0.76) 
--              
(--) 
-0.30








***          
(3.02) 
0.17           
(1.32) 
1.02
***         
(20.83) 
0.97
***       
(40.98) 
--              
(--) 
0.53
***          
(12.78) 
--              
(--) 
0.03         
(0.60) 
--              
(--) 
-0.07







**          
(-2.46) 
-1.20
**          
(-2.14) 
0.21            
(1.59) 
0.04            
(0.39) 
--              
(--) 
0.27
*           
(1.71) 
--              
(--) 
0.16           
(0.57) 
--              
(--) 
-0.23





 Alpha  rmt – rit  SMBt  HMLt  MOMt  R
2 
Both             
corporate 
responses 
-0.83           
(-1.01) 
-2.00
***         
(-2.61) 
1.27
***          
(7.22) 
1.03
***          
(8.11) 
--              
(--) 
0.97
***          
(6.22) 
--              
(--) 
0.32         
(1.12) 
--              
(--) 
-0.28








**         
(2.48) 
0.28           
(1.46) 
1.01
***         
(17.75) 
0.91
***       
(35.55) 
--              
(--) 
0.49
***          
(12.33) 
--              
(--) 
-0.01           
(-0.11) 
--              
(--) 
-0.10







**          
(-2.20) 
-2.27
***         
(-2.69) 
0.26
*           
(1.69) 
0.11            
(0.85) 
--              
(--) 
0.49
***          
(2.88) 
--              
(--) 
0.33            
(1.06) 
--              
(--) 





 Alpha  rmt – rit  SMBt  HMLt  MOMt  R
2 




*           
(1.80) 
0.47
**          
(2.48) 
0.97
***          
(21.10) 
1.03
***          
(12.74) 
--              
(--) 
-0.22           
(-0.83) 
--              
(--) 
-0.03           
(-0.19) 
--              
(--) 




No            
corporate 
responses 
0.26        
(1.30) 
-0.06           
(-0.58) 
1.15
***         
(22.02) 
1.02
***       
(27.09) 
--              
(--) 
0.66
***          
(7.93) 
--              
(--) 
0.08            
(0.74) 
--              
(--) 






0.11            
(0.37) 
0.53
**          
(2.35) 
-0.18
***         
(-2.59) 
0.01           
(0.11) 
--              
(--) 
-0.88
***         
(-3.05) 
--              
(--) 
-0.11           
(-0.64) 
--              
(--) 





* (**, ***) means that the appropriate parameter is different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) significance level, 
respectively. 
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Table 7: Parameter estimates (z-statistics) for the US stock market, portfolios according to 
both corporate responses to climate change (i.e. climate impact statement and carbon reduc-
tion measures) 
2001-2006 
 Alpha  rmt – rit  SMBt  HMLt  MOMt  R
2 
Both              
corporate 
responses 
-0.09           
(-0.26) 
-0.47           
(-1.58) 
1.01
***          
(9.26) 
0.93
***          
(9.92) 
--              
(--) 
0.02            
(0.17) 
--              
(--) 
0.56
***        
(4.49) 
--              
(--) 
-0.29








*          
(1.70) 
-0.03           
(-0.20) 
0.95
***         
(18.32) 
0.99
***       
(26.35) 
--              
(--) 
0.14
**          
(2.51) 
--              
(--) 
0.23
***      
(3.97) 
--              
(--) 






-0.37           
(-1.13) 
-0.44
*          
(-1.65) 
0.06            
(0.67) 
-0.06          
(-0.69) 
--              
(--) 
-0.12           
(-1.31) 
--              
(--) 
0.33
***          
(2.69) 
--              
(--) 
-0.28





 Alpha  rmt – rit  SMBt  HMLt  MOMt  R
2 
Both           
corporate 
responses 
0.02          
(0.03) 
-0.45           
(-0.80) 
1.04
***          
(8.33) 
0.87
***          
(5.71) 
--              
(--) 
-0.01           
(-0.08) 
--              
(--) 
0.58
***         
(3.73) 
--              
(--) 
-0.34




No            
corporate 
responses 
0.38        
(1.51) 
-0.01           
(-0.05) 
0.93
***         
(15.68) 
0.99
***       
(20.95) 
--              
(--) 
0.12            
(1.50) 
--              
(--) 
0.31
***      
(5.01) 
--              
(--) 






-0.36           
(-0.69) 
-0.43           
(-0.89) 
0.12            
(1.17) 
-0.12          
(-0.85) 
--              
(--) 
-0.13          
(-1.10) 
--              
(--) 
0.27
*           
(1.89) 
--              
(--) 
-0.31





 Alpha  rmt – rit  SMBt  HMLt  MOMt  R
2 
Both           
corporate 
responses 
-0.10           
(-0.34) 
-0.56
*          
(-1.68) 
0.82
***          
(7.03) 
1.08
***          
(6.61) 
--             
(--) 
-0.14           
(-0.82) 
--              
(--) 
0.53
***          
(3.24) 
--              
(--) 
-0.17




No             
corporate 
responses 
0.05         
(0.29) 
0.24            
(1.27) 
1.11
***         
(17.32) 
0.95
***       
(8.98) 
--              
(--) 
0.18
*           
(1.93) 
--              
(--) 
-0.17           
(-1.54) 
--              
(--) 






-0.15           
(-0.49) 
-0.80
***         
(-3.31) 
-0.29
**         
(-2.56) 
0.14           
(1.34) 
--              
(--) 
-0.32
**          
(-2.39) 
--              
(--) 
0.70
***          
(6.06) 
--              
(--) 
-0.16





* (**, ***) means that the appropriate parameter is different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) significance level, 
respectively.  
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